We present two defeasible logics of norm-propositions (statements about norms) that (i) consistently allow for the possibility of normative gaps and normative conflicts, and (ii) map each premise set to a sufficiently rich consequence set. In order to meet (i), we define the logic LNP, a conflict-and gap-tolerant logic of norm-propositions capable of formalizing both normative conflicts and normative gaps within the object language. Next, we strengthen LNP within the adaptive logic framework for non-monotonic reasoning in order to meet (ii). This results in the adaptive logics LNP r and LNP m , which interpret a given set of premises in such a way that normative conflicts and normative gaps are avoided 'whenever possible'. LNP r and LNP m are equipped with a preferential semantics and a dynamic proof theory.
1. Introduction
Normative conflicts and normative gaps
Ideally, sets of norms issued by agents, authorities, legislators, etc. are both consistent and complete. In our everyday practice, however, such sets often contain norm-conflicts and norm-gaps. A norm-conflict occurs when two or more norms are issued that are mutually unsatisfiable. The existence of such conflicts is motivated as follows by Alchourrón and Bulygin: Even one and the same authority may command that p and that not p at the same time, especially when a great number of norms are enacted on the same occasion. This happens when the legislature enacts a very extensive statute, e.g. a Civil Code, that usually contains four to six thousand dispositions. All of them are regarded as promulgated at the same time, by the same authority, so that there is no wonder that they sometimes contain a certain amount of explicit or implicit contradictions [3, pp. 112-113] .
Norm-conflicts do not always consist of conflicting commands or obligations. They also arise where both an obligation to do something and a (positive) permission not to do it are promulgated [1, 3, 12, 46] .
The logics presented in this paper should not just be able to adequately deal with normative conflicts but also with normative gaps. We say that a set of norms contains a normative gap with respect to a A if A is neither positively permitted nor forbidden nor obliged. For a defense of the existence of normative gaps, see e.g. [2, Chapters 7, 8] , [13] .
Note that the formulation refers to positive permissions (also, strong permissions), i.e. permissions that are either explicitly stated as such, or permissions that are derivable from other explicitly stated permissions or obligations. This is to be distinguished from so-called weak or negative permissions: A is weakly permitted in case A is not forbidden. Would we replace "positive permission" by "weak permission" in the definition of normative gaps then the concept would be vacuous since each A is either forbidden or not forbidden (and hence, weakly permitted).
The practical use of the distinction between positive and negative permission can be illustrated by means of the legal principle nullum crimen sine lege. According to this principle anything which is not forbidden is permitted. Alternatively, the principle states that a negative permission to do A implies a positive permission to do A. Typically, the nullum crimen principle is understood as a rule of closure permitting all the actions not prohibited by penal law [2, pp. 142-143] . We return to this principle in Section 2.1.
We will in the remainder of the paper tacitly assume that in case A is obliged then A is positively permitted. In this case, there is a normative gap with respect to A iff A is neither positively permitted nor forbidden.
Another way to think about normative gaps is in terms of normative determination: A is normatively determined if and only if A is either positively permitted or forbidden, which is to say that there is no normative gap with respect to A. 1 We say that a set of norms is normatively complete if all of its norms are normatively determined, i.e. if there are no gaps with respect to any of its norms. From the existence of incomplete legal systems, Bulygin concludes that legal gaps are perfectly possible:
It is not true that all legal systems are necessarily complete. The problem of completeness is an empirical, contingent, question, whose truth depends on the contents of the system. So legal gaps due to the silence of the law . . . are perfectly possible [13, p. 28 ].
Norm-propositions and their formal representation
In ordinary language, normative sentences exhibit a characteristic ambiguity. The very same words may be used to enunciate a norm (give a prescription) and to make a normative statement (description) [44, pp. 104-106] . In deontic logic, it is important to carefully distinguish between this prescriptive and descriptive use of norms.
When interpreted prescriptively, a formula of the form OA means something like "you ought to do A ", or "it ought to be that A ", and a formula of the form PA means something like "you may do A ", or "it is permitted that A ". 2 When interpreted descriptively, a formula of the form OA [ PA ] means something like "there is a norm to the effect that A is obligatory [permitted]". Following [44] , we take the term norm to denote the prescriptive, and norm-proposition to denote the descriptive interpretation of normative statements. 3 According to Alchourrón and Bulygin [1, 2, 3] , any perceived harmony between norms and norm-propositions in deontic logic is merely apparent. Instead of using the same calculus of deontic logic for reasoning with both norms and norm-propositions, we need two separate logics: a logic of norms and a logic of norm-propositions. This paper is concerned with the characterization of a logic of norm-propositions.
In formal language normative conflicts are expressed by formulas such as OA ∧ O not A in case two obligations conflict, and OA ∧ P not A in case an obligation conflicts with a permission. We call a conflict of the former kind an OO-conflict, and a conflict of the latter kind an OP-conflict.
Normative gaps occur if neither PA nor O not A is the case. A full formal characterization of normative gaps is presented after the definition of our formal language. As pointed out above, the permission in question is a strong permission. Weak permissions may be simply defined as the modal dual to O:
by not O not A . The latter expresses that "there is no norm to the effect that not A is obliged" and hence it expresses the descriptive meaning of a weak permission. However, we need an independent permission operator P in order to express strong permissions. From PA we cannot infer not O not A due to the possible existence of an OP-conflict. Similarly we cannot, vice versa, infer PA from not O not A since, despite the absence of a norm that expresses that not A is obliged, A may not be positively permitted. 4 
The structure of the paper
This paper is structured as follows. In Section 2 we define the logic LNP of which the syntax is sufficiently expressive to formalize all properties peculiar to norm-propositions without having to resort to the meta-language. Inside the scope of its deontic operators, LNP makes use of a paraconsistent and paracomplete negation connective for dealing with normative conflicts and normative gaps.
As a result of the weakness of this negation connective, LNP is not powerful enough for capturing many intuitive normative inferences. We deal with this problem in Section 3, where we strengthen LNP within the adaptive logics framework for non-monotonic reasoning. This results in two adaptive logics which interpret a given premise set 'as consistently and as completely as possible'.
In Section 4 we equip the logics defined in Section 3 with a proof theory, and prove some further meta-theoretical results. In Section 5, we compare our logics to other approaches taken up in the literature on norm-propositions and on conflicting norms.
A negation-weakened foundation: the logic LNP

Syntax
In the setting of norm-propositions, negation behaves differently depending on whether it occurs inside or outside the scope of an operator O or P. Outside the scope of a deontic operator, negation behaves classically. A formula not Op is read as "it is not the case that there is a norm to the effect that p is obligatory". Under this reading, not Op is incompatible with Op : Op and not Op cannot both be the case.
Things change when we turn to negations inside the scope of O or P. Here, both Op and O not p are verified by the same set of norm-propositions if this set contains an OO-conflict with respect to p. Moreover, neither Pp nor O not p are verified by a given set of norm-propositions that contains a normative gap with respect to p. Given the standard laws of distribution for O and P, this means that -inside the scope of O or P-both the consistency and the completeness constraint for negation fail in some instances: P(p ∧ not p) is true in case of a normative conflict, and O(p ∨ not p) is false in case of a normative gap.
The logic LNP is defined in such a way that it respects this distinction: outside the scope of a deontic operator, only the classical negation connective "¬" occurs. Inside the scope of a deontic operator, LNP makes use of the connective "∼", which is a paraconsistent and paracomplete "negation" connective, i.e. it invalidates both (A ∧ ∼A) ⊃ B (Ex Contradictione Quodlibet) and A ∨ ∼A (Excluded Middle).
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Where W a = {p, q, r, . . .} is a denumerable set of atomic propositions, we define W ¬ as the ¬, ∨, ∧, ⊃, ≡ -closure of W a , and W ∼ as the ∼, ∨, ∧, ⊃, ≡ -closure of W a . Let:
Then the set W of well-formed formulas of LNP is defined as the ¬, ∨, ∧, ⊃, ≡ -closure of W ¬ ∪ W O . Since the denotation of formulas is no longer ambiguous now that our language W is defined, we skip the -marks in the remainder of the paper. For future reference, we also define the set W l = {A, ∼A | A ∈ W a } of ∼-literals. Both normative conflicts and normative gaps are expressible in the object language W. A normative conflict occurs relating to a formula A ∈ W ∼ whenever we can derive one of OA ∧ O∼A or OA ∧ P∼A. A normative gap occurs relating to A whenever we can derive ¬PA ∧ ¬O∼A, i.e. whenever there is no norm to the effect that A is permitted or forbidden.
The P-operator functions as an operator for positive permission. A proposition A is said to be negatively permitted if there is no obligation to the contrary, i.e. if ¬O∼A. The nullum crimen principle can be formalized as an axiom schema:
(NC) ¬O∼A ⊃ PA Clearly, (NC) a priori excludes the possibility of normative gaps. That is why it is invalidated by any gap-tolerant logic of norm-propositions.
Semantics
LNP is characterizable within a Kripke-style semantics with a set of worlds or points W and a designated or 'actual' world w 0 ∈ W . In w 0 , negation is defined classically by means of the connective "¬". In the other worlds, negation is defined by the paraconsistent and paracomplete connective "∼". 5 "∼" as defined below is actually a "dummy" connective rather than a negation connective: it has no properties at all, except that it validates de Morgan's laws. However, in sections 3 and 4 we show that "∼" functions as a negation connective in the adaptive extensions of the logic LNP. 6 The semantic clauses for accessible worlds are inspired by those for (the propositional fragment of) Batens' paraconsistent and paracomplete logic CLoNs, a variation on the paraconsistent logic CLuNs as found in e.g. [8] . CLoNs is defined in Section Appendix A of the Appendix.
An LNP-model is a tuple W, w 0 , R, v 0 , v , where R = {w 0 } × (W \ {w 0 }) is a serial accessibility relation, and v 0 : W a → {0, 1} and v : W l × (W \ {w 0 }) → {0, 1} are assignment functions. v 0 assigns truth-values to atomic propositions. Since all logical connectives (including negation) behave classically in this world, truth values for complex formulas can be defined in terms of a valuation function in the usual way. The situation is slightly different for other worlds. In the latter, the ∼-connective does not behave classically and truth values are assigned to all ∼-literals, i.e. all atomic propositions p and their ∼-negation ∼p.
, associated with the model M , is defined by
where
where 
Axiomatization and meta-theory
Inside the scope of O and P, we want to allow for the consistent possibility of contradictions and gaps. In order to do so, we make use of the propositional fragment of the logic CLoNs (cfr. footnote 6). CLoNs is defined by adding de Morgan's laws for "∼" to the positive fragment of classical (propositional) logic CL:
Except for de Morgan's laws, "∼" has no properties at all. The logic LNP is fully axiomatized by CL (with the classical negation connective "¬") plus:
We write Γ LNP A to denote that A is LNP-derivable from Γ, and LNP A to denote that A is LNP-derivable from the empty premise set.
LNP resembles SDL in the sense that it contains (K), (D), and a necessitation rule. However, it is non-standard in the sense that its necessitation rule (NEC ∼ ) is defined in terms of theoremhood in CLoNs instead of theoremhood in CL. Moreover, in LNP the permission operator P is not definable in terms of the obligation operator O. Instead, the P-operator is characterized by the axiom schemata (KP), (OD), and (PD), all of which also hold in SDL. 
Discussion
LNP allows for the consistent possibility of normative conflicts and normative gaps, and invalidates deontic explosion:
In accordance with the discussion in Section 1.2, the following interdependencies between the O-and P-operators are invalid in LNP:
(4)- (7) correspond to the characterization of the P-operator as an operator for positive permission. (4) fails in the presence of an OP-conflict Pp ∧ O∼p. (5) fails in the presence of a gap ¬Pp ∧ ¬O∼p. (6) fails in the presence of a conflict Op ∧ P∼p, and (7) fails in the presence of a gap ¬P∼p ∧ ¬Op.
The conflict-and gap-tolerance of LNP, as well as the non-interdefinability of its O-and P-operators, all depend crucially on the paraconsistency and paracompleteness of the "∼"-connective. However, the very weak characterization of "∼"also causes the LNP-invalidity of the following inferences:
Indeed, except for de Morgan's laws LNP invalidates all classically valid inferences that somehow depend on the properties of the ∼-connective, e.g. the Disjunctive Syllogism or Contraposition rules. (8) is invalid because the possibility of an OO-conflict Oq ∧ O∼q cannot be excluded. In that case, Op need not follow from the premises O(p ∨ q) and O∼q. Likewise, (9) is invalid since Oq need not follow from O(p ∨ q) and O(∼p ∨ q) in the presence of an OO-conflict Op ∧ O∼p. (10) fails (i) in case of a normative conflict relating to q or (ii) in case of a normative gap relating to p. Suppose that O(p ⊃ q) and O∼q are true at the actual world. Then p ⊃ q and ∼q are true at all accessible worlds. In case (i), both q and ∼q are true in at least one accessible world. In this world, p ⊃ q is automatically true in view of (C⊃), and ∼p need not be true. In case ∼p is false at an accessible world, we have a model in which O∼p is false at the actual world. In case (ii), both p and ∼p will be false in at least one accessible world. Again we have a model in which O∼p is false at the actual world.
For similar reasons all of the following 'variants' of (8)- (10) are invalid in LNP:
In spite of the rationale behind their invalidity (i.e. the possibility of normative conflicts/gaps), all of (8)- (17) have some intuitive appeal. In real life, we tend to assume that norms behave consistently and that propositions are normatively regulated. Normative conflicts and normative gaps are anomalies. We rely on inferences like (8)- (17) in our everyday reasoning processes, albeit in a defeasible way. It seems then, that LNP is too weak to account for our normative reasoning. Inferences like (8)- (17) should only be blocked once we can reasonably assume that one of the norm-propositions needed in the inference behaves abnormally, i.e. that there might be a conflict or gap relating to this norm-proposition. Note that this reasoning process is non-monotonic: new premises may provide the information that there is a conflict or gap relating to some norm-proposition that was previously deemed to behave normally. Consider, for instance, the inference from O(p ∨ q) and O∼p to Oq. This inference is intuitive assuming that there is no normative conflict relating to p. If, however, we obtain the new information that there is a normative conflict relating to p, then the inference should be blocked, since we do not want to rely on conflicted norm-propositions in deriving new information.
In the next section, we strengthen LNP in a non-monotonic fashion in order to overcome the problems mentioned here, and to make formally precise the idea of 'assuming' norm-propositions to behave 'normally'.
Two adaptive extensions
For any A ∈ W a , the classical negation connective "¬" satisfies the following semantic conditions at the actual world:
( †) guarantees the consistency of A: A and ¬A cannot both be true at w 0 . ( ‡) imposes a completeness condition on A: at least one of A and ¬A is true at w 0 .
As is clear from the LNP-semantics, ( †) and ( ‡) fail for "∼" at accessible worlds. Instead of ( †) and ( ‡), only the weaker conditions ( †') and ( ‡') hold for "∼" at a world w ∈ W \ {w 0 }:
In view of the semantic clauses for LNP it is easily checked that whenever a normative conflict occurs relating to a proposition p, the formula p ∧ ∼p is true at some accessible world. In case of an OP-conflict Op ∧ P∼p or O∼p ∧ Pp, this follows in view of (CO), (CP), and (C∧). In case of an OO-conflict Op ∧ O∼p, it follows in view of (CO), (C∧) and the seriality of the accessibility relation.
In a similar fashion, we can check that whenever a normative gap occurs relating to p, the formula p ∨ ∼p is false at some accessible world. Suppose, for instance, that ¬Op ∧ ¬P∼p is true at w 0 . Then by (C¬), both Op and P∼p are false at w 0 . By (CO), there is a world w such that Rw 0 w and v(p, w) = 0. By (CP), ∼p too is false at this world: v(∼p, w) = 0. By (C∨), v(p ∨ ∼p, w) = 0.
Normative conflicts create truth-value gluts, whereas normative gaps create truth-value gaps at accessible worlds. Suppose now that we label such gluts and gaps as abnormal, and that we try to interpret our worlds as normally as possible. Then, in view of ( †') and ( ‡'), normal behavior corresponds to the satisfaction of the consistency and completeness demands ( †) and ( ‡) for "∼" at accessible worlds.
The adaptive logics LNP r and LNP m defined in this section exploit the above idea in making the assumption that norm-propositions behave 'normally' unless and until we find out that they are involved in some normative conflict or gap. The LLL of an adaptive logic (AL) in standard format is its monotonic base; everything derivable by means of the LLL is derivable by means of the AL. The AL extends the LLL by interpreting abnormalities as false "as much as possible". The formal disambiguation of this idea is relative to the adaptive strategy used by the AL. At the moment, two adaptive strategies are included in the standard format: the reliability strategy and the minimal abnormality strategy.
We use LNP x as a generic name for the logics LNP r and LNP m . The former uses the reliability strategy, whereas the latter uses minimal abnormality (hence the superscripts r and m). Both of these logics have LNP as their LLL. Moreover, LNP r and LNP m share the same set of abnormalites Ω = Ω 1 ∪ Ω 2 , where
. Ω 1 is the set of atomic gluts true at some accessible world. Note that, in view of the validity of de Morgan's laws for "∼", more complex gluts can be reduced to (disjunctions of) atomic gluts by the LLL, e.g.
. Consequently, whenever some LNP-model verifies an OO-or OP-conflict, it also validates an abnormality in the set Ω 1 .
In view of the LNP-semantics, p ∨ ∼p is false at some accessible world whenever ¬O(p ∨ ∼p) is true at the actual world. Thus Ω 2 is the set of atomic gaps true at some accessible world. Again, complex instances of gaps are LNPreducible to a (disjunction of) atomic gap(s), e.g. if v M ((p∨q)∨∼(p∨q), w) = 0, then (v M (p ∨ ∼p, w) = 0 or v M (q ∨ ∼q, w) = 0). Hence whenever some LNPmodel verifies a normative gap, it also validates an abnormality in the set Ω 2 .
For any atomic proposition p, the Ω 2 -abnormality ¬O(p ∨ ∼p) expresses that there is an accessible world in which neither p nor ∼p is verified, whereas the Ω 1 -abnormality P(p ∧ ∼p) expresses that there is an accessible world in which both p and ∼p are verified. Thus, in LNP both gluts and gaps in accessible worlds constitute abnormalities. In view of the discussion at the beginning of this section, this means that both normative conflicts and normative gaps constitute abnormalities in LNP.
Semantically, adaptive logics proceed by selecting a subset of their LLLmodels. 8 This selection makes use of the abnormal part of an LNP-model, i.e. the set of all abnormalities verified by it. The abnormal part of an LNP-model M is defined as Ab(M ) = {A ∈ Ω | M LNP A}.
The minimal abnormality strategy selects all LNP-models of a premise set Γ which have a minimal abnormal part (with respect to set-inclusion).
The semantic consequence relation of the logic LNP m is defined by selecting the minimally abnormal LNP-models:
Before we can define the semantic consequence relation for LNP r , we need some more terminology. Where ∆ is a finite, non-empty set of abnormalities, the disjunction ∆ is called a Dab-formula and is written as Dab(∆). A Dab-formula Dab(∆) is a Dab-consequence of Γ if it is LNP-derivable from Γ; Dab(∆) is a minimal Dab-consequence of Γ if it is a Dab-consequence of Γ and there is no ∆ such that Dab(∆ ) is a Dab-consequence of Γ and ∆ ⊂ ∆.
The set of formulas that are unreliable with respect to Γ, denoted by U (Γ), is defined by
. is the set of formulas that are unreliable with respect to Γ.
Where Ab(M ) is defined as above, we can now select the reliable models and define the semantic consequence relation for LNP r :
Definition 5. Γ |= LNP r A iff A is verified by all reliable models of Γ.
The fact that the set of LNP x -models of Γ is a subset of the set of LNPmodels of Γ immediately ensures that LNP x strengthens LNP.
, and M r Γ denote the set of LNP-models, minimally abnormal LNP-models, resp. reliable LNP-models of Γ, we also know that:
Theorem 4 is shown generically for adaptive logics in standard format as Corollary 1 in [6] .
Some illustrations
. By (CO), M, w |= p and M, w |= ∼p ∨ q for all worlds w such that Rw 0 w. The possible truth values for p, ∼p, q, and ∼q at accessible worlds in M are depicted in Table 1a . Let R(w 0 ) abbreviate the set of worlds w ∈ W \ {w 0 } such that Rw 0 w. Then each w ∈ R(w 0 ) is of one of types (1)-(6). 
If at least one w ∈ R(w 0 ) is of one of types (3)-(6), then, by (C∧) and (CP), M, w 0 |= P(p ∧ ∼p), and P(p ∧ ∼p) ∈ Ab(M ). Similarly, if at least one w ∈ R(w 0 ) is of type (2) or type (6), then P(q ∧∼q) ∈ Ab(M ). Moreover, if some w ∈ R(w 0 ) is of type (3), then, by (C∨), (CO) and (C¬), M, w 0 |= ¬O(q ∨ ∼q), and ¬O(q ∨ ∼q) ∈ Ab(M ).
If, however, all worlds w ∈ R(w 0 ) are of type (1), then M verifies no abnormalities relating to p or q. In view of Definition 1, only models for which all worlds w ∈ R(w 0 ) are of type (1) qualify as minimally abnormal LNP-models of Γ 1 . Note that, for all type (1)-worlds w ∈ R(w 0 ), M, w |= q. By (CO), M, w 0 |= Oq. By Definition 2, Γ 1 |= LNP m Oq.
Since Γ 1 has LNP-models M of which all accessible worlds w ∈ R(w 0 ) are such that, for all A ∈ W a , M, w |= A∧∼A and M, w |= A∨∼A, we can conclude that Γ 1 has LNP-models M such that Ab(M ) = ∅. It follows that Γ 1 has no minimal Dab-consequences. In view of Definition 3, U (Γ 1 ) = ∅. By Definition 4, Ab(M ) = ∅ for all reliable LNP-models M of Γ 1 . Again, only models for which all worlds w ∈ R(w 0 ) are of type (1) qualify as reliable LNP-models of Γ 1 . By Definition 5, Γ 1 |= LNP r Oq.
Example 2. Let Γ 2 = {Op, O(∼p ∨ q), O∼p}. It is easily checked that Γ 2 |= LNP P(p ∧ ∼p). Consequently, all LNP-models verify this abnormality, including the minimally abnormal and reliable ones. Hence all accessible worlds in all LNPmodels of Γ 2 are of one of types (3)- (6) in Table 1a . Since P(p ∧ ∼p) is the only Dab-consequence of Γ 2 , the selected LNP x -models for both strategies are those which verify exactly this abnormality, i.e. models of which all accessible worlds are of type (4) or (5) . In all of these models, p, ∼p ∨ q, and ∼p are true at all accessible worlds. Since q need not be true at some of these worlds, Γ 2 has LNP
x -models in which Oq is false. Hence Γ 2 |= LNP Table 1b .
If at least one w ∈ R(w 0 ) is of one of types (1) or (2), then ¬O(p ∨ ∼p) ∈ Ab(M ). If at least one w ∈ R(w 0 ) is of one of types (2), (4), (5) Table 2 . By (CP), we also know that there is at least one world w such that w ∈ R(w 0 ) and M, w |= ∼p ∨ ∼q. Thus, w cannot be of type (1) or type (2) . If w is of type (3), then P(q ∧ ∼q) ∈ Ab(M ). If w is of type (5), then P(p ∧ ∼p) ∈ Ab(M ). It is easily checked that if w is of type (4), (6), (7), (8), (9), or (10), then either {P(p ∧ ∼p)} ⊂ Ab(M ) or {P(q ∧ ∼q)} ⊂ Ab(M ).
In general, it follows by Definition 1 that M only qualifies as a minimally abnormal LNP-model of Γ 4 if either w is of type (3) and all w ∈ R(w 0 ) \ {w} are of type (1) 
Since at least one accessible world w in M is of types (3)- (10), it follows by (C∧), (CP), and (C∨) that M, w 0 |= P(p ∧ ∼p) ∨ P(q ∧ ∼q). Since M, w 0 |= P(p∧∼p) and M, w 0 |= P(q∧∼q), it follows that P(p∧∼p)∨P(q∧∼q) is a minimal Dab-consequence of Γ 4 . Thus, by Definition 3, P(p ∧ ∼p), P(q ∧ ∼q) ∈ U (Γ 4 ).
Suppose now that all w ∈ R(w 0 ) are of type (8), and that, for all A ∈ W a \ {p, q, r}, M, w |= A ∧ ∼A and M, w |= A ∨ ∼A. Then it is easily verified that the only abnormalities verified by M are P(p ∧ ∼p) and P(q ∧ ∼q). Thus, 
Proof theory
A line in an annotated LNP x -proof consists of a line number, a formula, a justification and a condition. The justification consists of a (possibly empty) list of line numbers (from which the formula is derived) and of the name of a rule. The presence of a condition is part of what makes an adaptive proof dynamic. The dynamics of these proofs is controlled by attaching conditions to derived formulas and by a marking definition. The rules determine which lines (consisting of the four aforementioned elements) may be added to a given proof. The effect of the marking definition is that, at every stage 9 of the proof, certain lines may be marked whereas others are unmarked. Whether or not a line is marked depends only on the condition of the line and on the minimal Dab-formulas (cfr. Definition 6) that have been derived in the proof.
The rules of inference of LNP x reduce to three generic rules. Where Γ is the set of premises, and where A ∆ abbreviates that A occurs in the proof on the condition ∆, the inference rules are given by
. . . . . .
The premise rule PREM simply states that, at any line of a proof, a premise may be introduced on the empty condition. What the unconditional rule RU comes to is that, whenever A 1 , . . . , A n LNP B and A 1 , . . . , A n occur in the proof on the conditions ∆ 1 , . . . , ∆ n respectively, then B may be added to the proof on the condition ∆ 1 ∪ . . . ∪ ∆ n .
If A 1 , . . . , A n LNP B ∨ Dab(Θ) and A 1 , . . . , A n occur in a proof on the conditions ∆ 1 , . . . , ∆ n respectively, then, by the conditional rule RC, we can infer B on the condition ∆ 1 ∪ . . . ∪ ∆ n ∪ Θ. RC is the only rule that allows for the introduction of new conditions in an adaptive proof.
The marking definition for the reliability strategy proceeds in terms of the minimal Dab-formulas derived at a stage of the proof: The marking definition for minimal abnormality requires some more terminology. A choice set of Σ = {∆ 1 , ∆ 2 , . . .} is a set that contains one element out of each member of Σ. A minimal choice set of Σ is a choice set of Σ of which no proper subset is a choice set of Σ. Where Dab(∆ 1 ), Dab(∆ 2 ), . . . are the minimal Dab-formulas that are derived at stage s, Φ s (Γ) is the set of minimal choice sets of {∆ 1 , ∆ 2 , . . .}.
Definition 9.
Marking for minimal abnormality. Where A ∈ W is derived at line i of a proof from Γ on a condition ∆, line i is marked at stage s iff (i) there is no ∆ ∈ Φ s (Γ) such that ∆ ∩ ∆ = ∅, or (ii) for some ∆ ∈ Φ s (Γ), there is no line at which A is derived on a condition Θ for which ∆ ∩ Θ = ∅.
For both strategies, the marking proceeds in terms of the minimal Dabformulas that are derived at a certain stage. It is clear that marking is a dynamic matter: a line may be unmarked at a stage s, marked at a later stage s and again unmarked at an even later stage s . This is why a more stable notion of derivability is needed:
Definition 10. A is finally derived from Γ at line i of a proof at finite stage s iff (i) A is the second element of line i, (ii) line i is not marked at stage s, and (iii) every extension of the proof in which line i is marked may be further extended in such a way that line i is unmarked.
The derivability relation of LNP
x is defined with respect to the notion of final derivability: Any adaptive logic in standard format is sound and complete with respect to its semantics:
Since LNP x is defined within the standard format for adaptive logics, the proof of Theorem 6 follows immediately by Corollary 2 and Theorem 9 from [6].
Illustration
In this section, we illustrate the proof theory by means of the premise set Γ 4 from Section 3.2. We start a LNP r -proof for Γ 4 by entering the premises via the premise introduction rule: 
) is a CLoNs-theorem, line 6 follows from line 5 by (NEC ∼ ) and (K). Thus, via RU:
6; RU ∅ 8 Or 7; RC {P(p ∧ ∼p)} Line 7 is obtained by applying (OD) to line 6. At line 8, the abnormality derived in disjunction with Or at line 7 is moved to the condition by means of an application of RC. At stage 8 of the proof, Or is considered derived. Intuitively, line 8 can be interpreted as "Or is derived on the assumption that P(p ∧ ∼p) is false".
In the proof above, lines 4-7 serve a purely explanatory purpose; their aim is to show that Or ∨ P(p ∧ ∼p) is a LNP-consequence of lines 1 and 2. However,
, we could have skipped these lines and applied RC immediately to lines 1 and 2.
In a fashion analogous to the derivation of Or ∨ P(p ∧ ∼p) above, we can show that O(p ∧ q), O(∼(p ∨ q) ∨ r) LNP Or ∨ P(q ∧ ∼q). Hence we can apply RC immediately to lines 1 and 2:
9 Or 1,2; RC {P(q ∧ ∼q)} Consider now the premises at lines 1 and 3. By (P-AND), we can derive P((p∧q)∧(∼p∨∼q)). Since CLoNs ((p∧q)∧(∼p∨∼q)) ⊃ ((p∧∼p)∨(q ∧∼q)), it follows by (NEC ∼ ) and (KP) that P((p ∧ ∼p) ∨ (q ∧ ∼q)). By (PD), we obtain P(p ∧ ∼p) ∨ P(q ∧ ∼q). Thus we can continue the proof as follows (we repeat the proof from line 8 on): The formula P(p ∧ ∼p) ∨ P(q ∧ ∼q) is a minimal Dab-formula at stage 10. Both its disjuncts are in the set of unreliable formulas at this stage: U 10 (Γ 4 ) = {P(p ∧ ∼p), P(q ∧ ∼q)}. In view of Definition 8, this causes the marking of lines 8 and 9 at stage 10 (hence the checkmark sign). Consequently, the formula Or is no longer considered derived at stage 10 of the proof. Moreover, since there is no way to extend the proof from Γ 4 in such a way that Or is derived on an unmarked line, we know by Definitions 10 and 11 that Γ 4 LNP r Or. Suppose now that the above proof is a LNP m -proof from Γ 4 . We repeat the proof from line 8 on:
8 Or
7; RC
{P(p ∧ ∼p)} 9 Or 6; RC {P(q ∧ ∼q)} 10 P(p ∧ ∼p) ∨ P(q ∧ ∼q) 1,3; RU ∅
In the LNP m -proof from Γ 4 , the set Φ 10 (Γ 4 ) of minimal choice sets of Γ 4 at stage 10 consists of the sets {P(p ∧ ∼p)} and {P(q ∧ ∼q)}. In view of Definition 9, lines 8 and 9 remain unmarked. Since there is no way to extend the proof in such a way that these lines become marked, it follows by Definitions 10 and 11 that Γ 4 LNP m Or.
The different behavior of the logics LNP r and LNP m for this example is explained by considering the intuitions behind the reliability and minimal abnormality strategies. According to the reliability strategy, a formula is deemed 'suspicious' and is subsequently marked whenever it is derived on a line of which the condition intersects with some disjunct of a minimal Dab-formula. The minimal abnormality strategy is a tad less cautious. In this example, the latter strategy takes only one of the disjuncts P(p ∧ ∼p) and P(q ∧ ∼q) to be true, although of course we do not know which one. If, on the one hand, P(p ∧ ∼p) is true, then P(q ∧ ∼q) is safely considered false. Hence Or is derivable in view of line 9. If, on the other hand, P(q ∧ ∼q) is true, then P(p ∧ ∼p) is safely considered false. Hence Or is derivable in view of line 8.
Further meta-theoretical properties
Formulating adaptive logics in the standard format has the advantage that a rich meta-theory is immediately available for this format. Generic proofs for Theorems 7-9 below can be found in [6] .
In case no Dab-formulas are derivable from a premise set by means of the lower limit logic, it is safe to consider all abnormalities as false. As a consequence, the adaptive logic will then yield the same consequence set as the logic that interprets all abnormalities as false (or equivalently, as the logic that fully validates the inference rules whose application the adaptive logic only allows conditionally). This logic is called the upper limit logic (ULL) of an adaptive logic. The ULL of LNP x is obtained by adding to LNP the axiom schemas (U 1 ) and (U 2 ), which trivialize all members of Ω 1 and Ω 2 respectively:
ULL is related to LNP as set out by the Derivability Adjustment Theorem:
The set of Dab-consequences derivable from the premise set determines the amount to which the LNP x -consequence set will resemble the ULL-consequence set. This is why adaptive logicians say that LNP
x adapts itself to a premise set. LNP x will always be at least as strong as LNP and maximally as strong as ULL:
In view of Theorem 11 from [6] , it follows immediately that:
If Γ is normal, i.e. if Γ has no Dab-consequences, then we can even prove a stronger result:
The reader may have noticed that ULL trivializes both gluts and gaps at accessible worlds, thus promoting "∼" to a fully classical negation connective. It should come as no surprise then, that ULL is just SDL in disguise. Where Γ ⊆ W, define Γ ¬ by replacing every A ∈ Γ by π(A), where π(A) is the result of replacing every occurrence of "∼" in A by "¬". Then:
A proof outline for Theorem 10 is contained in Section Appendix D of the Appendix.
Related work
Alchourrón and Bulygin
In [1, 2, 3, 4], Alchourrón and Bulygin present a logic of norm-propositions that is built 'on top' of a logic of norms. 10 A norm-proposition "there exists a norm to the effect that A is permitted" is formalized as NPA, where the operator N behaves like a quantifier over the norm PA. The latter formula (without N) is read simply as "A is permitted".
Alchourrón and Bulygin's logic of norms is just SDL. Their logic of normpropositions NL extends SDL by adding to it the axiom schema (NK) and the rule (NRM):
In NL, OO-conflicts are formulas of the form NOA ∧ NO¬A. Similarly, OP-conflicts are formulas of the form NOA ∧ NP¬A. As opposed to normative conflicts, normative gaps cannot be expressed in the object language of NL. Instead, Alchourrón and Bulygin define a normative gap as a situation in which, for some CL-formula A we cannot derive NPA nor NO¬A, i.e. NL NPA ∨ NO¬A. Normative conflicts and gaps are treated consistently in NL. Where A and B are well-formed NL-formulas:
However, the following variants of deontic explosion are valid in NL:
With Alchourrón, Bulygin, and von Wright, we agree that "experience seems to testify that mutually contradictory norms may co-exist within one and the same legal order -and also that there are a good many "gaps" in any such order" [46, p. 32] . But if conflicting normative propositions indeed often coexist within a normative order, then deontic explosion should be avoided by any logic of normative propositions. No judge will agree that a normative order containing one or more conflicts contains norms to the effect that anything whatsoever is obligatory. Hence (22) and (23) cause serious problems for NL. (22) and (23) follow by applications of (NRM) and (NK) to the SDLtheorems OA ⊃ (O∼A ⊃ OB) and OA ⊃ (P∼A ⊃ OB) respectively. This led von Wright to questioning the presupposition of SDL by NL [46, footnote 2].
As opposed to NL, LNP x is not built 'on top' of the CL-based logic SDL. Although LNP contains full CL, its 'deontic' formulas make use of the much weaker logic CLoNs inside the scope of the O-and P-operator. This way, LNP x avoids deontic explosion. Interestingly, Alchourrón and Bulygin point out that under the assumptions of consistency and completeness, the logic of norm-propositions is 'isomorphic' to SDL: if we dismiss the possibility of normative conflicts and normative gaps, the differences between both logics disappear [1, 4] . In Section 4.3 we proved this isomorphism for LNP x by showing that for normal (consistent and complete) premise sets, LNP
x is just as strong as SDL.
Input/output logic
In input/output logic (I/O logic), norms are represented as ordered pairs of formulas (a, x), where each coordinate of a pair is a CL-formula. 12 The 11 Alchourrón and Bulygin allow for iterated/nested deontic and normative operators. Nothing in principle prevents the occurrence of such nestings in LNP x . This requires some modifications of the language W and of the sets Ω 1 and Ω 2 such that e.g. PP(p ∧ ∼p) is also considered an abnormality. 12 The framework of I/O logic was initially developed for dealing with conditional norms. We do not discuss its merits as a conditional logic here. Instead, we focus on issues related to conflict-and gap-tolerance. For a discussion of the representation of conditional norms in I/O logic, see [48] .
body of such a pair constitutes an input consisting of some condition or factual situation. The head constitutes an output representing what the norm tells us to be desirable/obligatory/permitted in that situation. A normative order or system is a set G of input/output pairs. G is seen as a 'transformation device' in which CL functions as its 'secretarial assistant' [31, p. 2] .
In [28] , Makinson and van der Torre define various operations of the form out(G, A) for making up the output A of G. In [29] , the authors add constraints to these systems for dealing with contrary-to-duty scenarios and conflicting norms. In [30] , the framework is extended for dealing with permissions. Constrained I/O logics make use of maximally consistent subsets. In doing so, they avoid explosion when dealing with conflicting conditional obligations, even if e.g. the norms (a, x) and (a, ¬x) tell us that both x and ¬x are obligatory under the same circumstances.
The treatment of obligation-permission conflicts by constrained I/O logics is less straightforward. In [39] , Stolpe noted that the constrained systems deontically explode when facing a conflict between an obligation (a, x) and a positive permission (a, ¬x). 13 Stolpe's solution to this problem is to treat positive permissions as derogations: "a positive permission suspends, annuls or obstructs a covering prohibition, thereby generating a corresponding set of liberties" [39, p. 99 ].
Stolpe's solution creates an asymmetry between obligations and permissions. In obligation-obligation conflicts, both norms may still be of equal importance. In obligation-permission conflicts however, the permission always overrides the obligations it is in conflict with. Although certainly of interest in legal contexts, where the concept of derogation is a very important one, we doubt that all obligation-permission conflicts can be dealt with in this way.
In the literature on I/O logic, normative gaps are left unmentioned. However, it seems possible to model gaps in this framework. For instance, we could say that there is a normative gap relating to proposition x in circumstances a if neither the obligations to do x or ¬x, nor the positive permissions to do x or ¬x are in the output of a given set of norms. One drawback seems to be that, whichever I/O operation we pick, both the obligation to do x ∨ ¬x and the positive permission to do x ∨ ¬x will always be in the output set. This is due to the closure of the output set under classical logic. Furthermore, as with Alchourrón and Bulygin's approach, normative gaps cannot be modeled at the object level in I/O logic.
Another difference between I/O logic and LNP x is that for I/O operations the input is restricted to simple norm-bases, i.e. sets of input-output pairs. More complex formulas such as disjunctions between norms or negated norms cannot be fed into the system. LNP
x is more flexible in this sense, since it can easily deal with premise sets containing formulas such as ¬Op, Oq ∨ Pr, etc.
SDL-weakened modal logics
The logics LNP and LNP x are SDL-weakened conflict-tolerant deontic logics. In the literature on conflicting norms in deontic logic, many different weakenings of SDL have been proposed for dealing with conflicting norms.
The most popular approach for tolerating normative conflicts is to weaken SDL by invalidating the aggregation principle (O-AND), e.g. [15, 36, 49, 16] . Non-monotonic systems that validate only certain applications of (O-AND) were presented in [25, 23, 19, 32, 33] .
14 An alternative approach for weakening SDL suggested by Goble in [17, 18] restricts the modal inheritance principle (RM):
The result is a family of monotonic SDL-weakened systems capable of consistently accommodating OO-conflicts. Non-monotonic adaptive extensions of this logic were presented in [40, 42] .
A third way of weakening SDL consists in giving up the Ex Contradictione Quodlibet schema:
The result is a paraconsistent deontic logic. This approach was taken up in [14, 34] . A non-monotonic adaptive paraconsistent deontic logic is presented in [11, 10] . The systems defined in this paper are 'paraconsistent' in the sense that they restrict (ECQ) for the negation connective "∼".
None of the SDL-weakened systems mentioned in this section were designed for reasoning in the presence of normative gaps. Consequently, these logics do not provide a satisfactory treatment of normative gaps. Moreover, in systems in which a permission operator is characterized, the latter is always treated as the dual of the obligation-operator, i.e. PA ≡ ¬O¬A is valid.
SDL-strengthened modal logics
In [26] , Kooi and Tamminga deal with conflicting norms by enriching SDL so as to be capable of distinguishing between various sources and interest groups in view of which norms arise. Moreover, following [24] they equip their system with modal stit-operators for dealing with the difficult notion of (moral) agency. Similarly, we could try to deal with conflicting norms by imposing a preference ordering on our obligations and permissions, e.g. [21] .
Such extensions are very successful in increasing the expressive power of SDL, but they are unable to consistently allow for all normative conflicts. Remember from Section 1.1 that conflicts may arise between norms promulgated at the same time, by the same authority. It is not difficult to see how we could extend this type of reasoning to norms of the same hierarchical foot, addressed at the same group of people etc. so that in the end we need a logic that invalidates at least some SDL-theorems if we want to deal with all instances of normative conflicts.
A weakness of the systems devised in this paper is that they are not very expressive. Relativizing the deontic operators to individual/group operators is relatively straightforward (this can be done by defining a set of operators O I and P I where I is an index set representing some (group of) agent(s)), but it is less clear how to extend LNP x in a way that it satisfactorily treats e.g. conditional norms or the notion of agency.
Moreover, the SDL-strengthened logics discussed here point to a trade-off between complexity and degrees of conflict-tolerance in dealing with conflicts in deontic logic. On the one hand, many normative conflicts can be dealt with in a monotonic way by making explicit the different sources they arise from or the different levels of priority attributed to them. On the other hand, if we want our logic to be fully conflict-tolerant we need to weaken SDL and allow only for the defeasible validity of some of its inferences. The latter option is technically more involving and computationally more complex. 15 
Conclusion and outlook
We presented two non-monotonic logics for reasoning with norm-propositions in the presence of normative conflicts and normative gaps. The logics LNP r and LNP m interpret a given premise set 'as consistently and as completely as possible'. LNP r uses a slightly more cautious strategy than LNP m . LNP r and LNP m are equipped with a well-defined semantics and proof theory. Due to their characterization within the standard framework for adaptive logics, soundness and completeness properties are guaranteed, as are many of their meta-theoretical properties.
As opposed to other systems devised for dealing with norm-propositions, the logics defined in this paper make use of a formal language in which all necessary distinctions can be made already at the object level. This is realized by making use of a classical negation connective outside, and a paraconsistent and paracomplete negation connective inside the scope of the operators O and P.
Two possible drawbacks of the non-classical SDL-weakened approach taken up here are that (i) due to their non-monotonicity the resulting logics are highly complex from the computational point of view; and (ii) the systems defined in this paper are not very expressive. In response to (i), we conjecture that in order to model actual human reasoning, a complex logic is what we need (see e.g. [9] ). In response to (ii), we point to some existing work on more expressive adaptive deontic logics [10, 41, 40] and hope to provide more results in the future.
APPENDIX
Proof of Theorem 1. Let in the following M = W, w0, R, v0, v be an LNP-model.
It is easy to check that all CL-axiom schemata hold at w0 in M due to (C0), (C¬), and (C⊃)-(C≡). Similarly, ( †) where w ∈ W \ {w0}, all CLoNs-axiom schemata hold at w in M due to (C l ) and (C∼∼)-(C≡).
Ad (NEC ∼ ). Let |= CLoNs A. By (CO), ( †) and the definition of R, vM (OA, w0) = 1.
Ad
. By (CO) and (C⊃), for all w ∈ R(w0), vM (A, w) = 0 or vM (B, w) = 1. Suppose M OA, then for all w ∈ R(w0), vM (A, w) = 1. Hence, for all w ∈ R(w0), vM (B, w) = 1. Thus by (CO), M OB. Hence, by
Ad (D). Suppose M OA. Hence for all w ∈ R(w0), vM (A, w) = 1 (by (CO)). By the seriality of R, there is a w ∈ R(w0) for which vM (A, w) = 1. By (CP), M PA.
. By (CO) and (C⊃), ( ‡) for all w ∈ R(w0), vM (A, w) = 0 or vM (B, w) = 1. Suppose M PA. Then, by (CP) there is a w ∈ R(w0) for which vM (A, w) = 1. Hence, by ( ‡), there is a w ∈ R(w0) such that vM (B, w) = 1. Thus, by (CP) M PB and, by (C⊃), M PA ⊃ PB. Altogether, by
. By (CO) and (C∨), ( ) for all w ∈ R(w0), vM (A, w) = 1 or vM (B, w) = 1. Suppose M PB. By (CP): for all w ∈ R(w0), vM (B, w) = 0. By ( ), for all w ∈ R(w0), vM (A, w) = 1. Thus, by (CO), M OA.
Ad (PD). This is similar to the previous case and is left to the reader. We now know that all axiom schemata and rules of LNP are semantically valid. That Γ LNP A implies Γ |= LNP A can now be shown via the usual induction on the length of the proof of A. This is safely left to the reader.
Let in the remainder Wc be the LNP-deductively closed and maximally LNP-nontrivial subsets of W. 17 Moreover, let W ∼ c be the CLoNs-deductively closed subsets Γ of W ∼ where Γ is prime, i.e. for each A ∨ B ∈ Γ either A ∈ Γ or B ∈ Γ. For the completeness proof of LNP, we make use of the following lemmas.
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Lemma 1. If ∆ ∈ Wc, then ∆ is prime.
Proof. Suppose that, for a ∆ ∈ Wc, A ∨ B ∈ ∆ and A ∈ ∆ and B ∈ ∆. Then, since ∆ is maximally LNP-non-trivial, ∆ ∪ {A} is trivial and ∆ ∪ {B} is trivial. Then, for any C ∈ W, ∆∪{A} LNP C and ∆∪{B} LNP C. Then, by Theorem 13, ∆ LNP A ⊃ C and ∆ LNP B ⊃ C. But then, by (MP) and (A∨3), ∆ LNP (A ∨ B) ⊃ C. Since A ∨ B ∈ ∆, since by (MP) ∆ LNP C, and since ∆ is LNP-deductively closed, C ∈ ∆. This contradicts the supposition. Hence if A ∨ B ∈ ∆, then A ∈ ∆ or B ∈ ∆. The other direction is shown in a similar way by means of (A∨1) and (A∨2). This is left to the reader.
Where Γ ∈ Wc and A ∈ W ∼ , we will use the following abbreviations:
and Γ is maximally L-non-trivial iff it is L-non-trivial and all supersets Γ ⊃ Γ are L-trivial. 18 The proof of Lemma 4 is inspired by the proof of Lemma 1.7.1 from [7] .
Proof. Ad (i): Suppose that ΓO CLoNs C. Then Γ CLoNs C for some finite Γ ⊆ ΓO (given the compactness of CLoNs). Hence, CLoNs Γ ⊃ C by Theorem 13. Thus, (given the compactness of CLoNs). Then Γ ∪ {A} CLoNs C by the monotonicity of CLoNs. Then CLoNs Γ ∧A ⊃ C by Theorem 13. Then LNP O Γ ∧A ⊃ C by (NEC ∼ ). Then LNP P Γ ∧ A ⊃ PC by (KP) and (MP). By the supposition, {OB | B ∈ Γ } ⊆ Γ and PA ∈ Γ. Given the deductive closure of Γ and LNP (O( Γ )∧ PA) ⊃ P( Γ ∧ A) (which follows from Fact 1 (ii)), it follows that P Γ ∧ A ∈ Γ. Hence PC ∈ Γ, since Γ is deductively closed and LNP P Γ ∧ A ⊃ PC.
Proof. Ad (i): Let C = I Ci where Ci ∈ ΓP . Suppose C ∈ Cn CLoNs (Γ A O ) then by Lemma 2 (ii), P I Ci ∈ Γ. Hence, by (PD), I PCi ∈ Γ. Hence, since Γ is prime, there is an i ∈ I for which PCi ∈ Γ and hence Ci / ∈ ΓP ,-a contradiction. Ad (ii): Let C = I Ci where Ci ∈ ΓP ∪ {B}. Suppose C ∈ Cn CLoNs (ΓO). By Lemma 2 (i), O I Ci ∈ Γ. Assume that all Ci ∈ ΓP . By (D), P I Ci ∈ Γ. By (PD), I PCi ∈ Γ. Hence, since Γ is prime, there is an i ∈ I such that PCi ∈ Γ and hence Ci / ∈ ΓP ,-a contradiction. Hence there is a non-empty J ⊆ I such that for each j ∈ J, Cj = B. Hence, by (OD), OB ∨ P I\J Ci. Thus, by (PD), OB ∨ I\J PCi. Since B / ∈ ΓO and since Γ is prime, there is an i ∈ I \ J such that PCi ∈ Γ and hence Ci / ∈ ΓP ,-a contradiction.
Lemma 4. Let Γ ∈ Wc. We first show that ∆ is CLoNs-deductively closed. Suppose there is a Bi / ∈ ∆ such that ∆ CLoNs Bi. Then, by the construction of ∆, there is a D ∈ Γ P such that ∆∪{Bi} CLoNs D and hence by Theorem 13, ∆ CLoNs Bi ⊃ D. However, by (MP) also ∆ CLoNs D. By the compactness of CLoNs there is a ∆i for which ∆i CLoNs D. By the construction ∆i = Cn CLoNs (∆i) and whence D ∈ ∆i. Hence, D ∈ ∆,-a contradiction with (ii) .
We now show that ∆ is prime. Suppose A1 ∨ A2 ∈ ∆. Assume A1, A2 / ∈ ∆. Hence, by the construction of ∆, ∆ ∪ {A1} CLoNs D1 and ∆ ∪ {A2} CLoNs D2 for some D1, D2 ∈ Γ P . By Theorem 13, ∆ CLoNs A1 ⊃ D1 and ∆ CLoNs A2 ⊃ D2. By some simple propositional manipulations, ∆ CLoNs (A1 ∨ A2) ⊃ (D1 ∨ D2). By (MP), ∆ CLoNs D1 ∨ D2 and hence D1 ∨ D2 ∈ ∆. However, by the definition of Γ P , D1 ∨ D2 ∈ Γ P ,-a contradiction with (ii) . Proof. By the definition, ULL verifies (K) and (D). It remains to show that ULL verifies (i) all instances of PA ≡ ¬O∼A and (ii) the rule "If CL ∼ A then ULL OA", where CL ∼ is classical propositional logic with the negation symbol ∼. Ad (i). Left-Right. By (A∧3), PA ⊃ (O∼A ⊃ (PA ∧ O∼A)). By Fact 1 (iv), (PA ∧ O∼A) ⊃ P(A ∧ ∼A). Thus, by some propositional manipulations in CL, PA ⊃ (O∼A ⊃ P(A ∧ ∼A)), which is CL-equivalent to ( †) PA ⊃ (¬O∼A ∨ P(A ∧ ∼A)). Suppose now that PA. By ( †), ¬O∼A ∨ P(A ∧ ∼A). Moreover, by (U1), P(A ∧ ∼A) ⊃ ¬O∼A. Thus, by (MP) and some simple CL-manipulations, we obtain ¬O∼A. 
